Les, over at Faith and Life, asked his readers to "interact" with this syllogism and the statement from which it has arisen. So...here I am interacting. I'm just cooperative like that.
1. If a perfectly good god exists, then there is no evil in the world.
2. There is evil in the world.
3. Therefore, a perfectly good god does not exist.
(Epicurus) Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?
First of all, a disclaimer (I'm fond of those!): whole books have been written about the problem of pain and suffering, and I could not hope to address the issues exhaustively here...or anywhere. But I will attempt to give a bare bones argument against the logic of the syllogism.
It seems to me that this syllogism is fundamentally flawed...something isn't right about its form which automatically makes it invalid, but I cannot immediately identify it and don't have time to get out my logic textbooks and figure it out! But, I suspect the technical "form" of the syllogism is not the primary question in this case anyway.
So...supposing the argument were sound in form, the next step is always to determine the soundness of the material...is it true or not? The first task in determining its soundness is to define the major terms, which in this case are "perfectly good God" and "evil."
Neither of these terms are definable in and of themselves and can only be understood in light of presuppositions which involve belief rather than verifiable, objective definitions. If an agreed definition cannot be reached, an argument cannot be satisfactorily refuted or confirmed in its conclusion.
Here is the basic problem: the ideas of good and evil necessarily assume the existence of a fixed moral standard. Apart from this, no action or lack of it can be considered morally superior (good) or morally inferior (evil). Apart from a standard, good and evil become subject to personal or social interpretation, both of which vascillate significantly from person to person, era to era, and culture to culture. Apart from a standard, these terms remain purely subjective, arbitrary, and in continual flux, thereby forfeiting all truth value.
Bottom line: If an objective, fixed moral standard does NOT exist, there is no such thing as inherent good or evil...only personal and social acceptance or rejection of particular behaviors. If that is the case, the argument cannot be proven or disproven because the terms cannot be defined. End of discussion. Refutation or confirmation of this argument requires the acknowledgement that this standard indeed DOES exist and the terms must be defined accordingly.
If we agree that an immoveable, uncompromising, unchanging standard exists, where does it come from? It can only derive from a Supreme Being (i.e. God) who in His nature and by His works has determined the standard. If the source is not authoritative and unchangeable, then the standard cannot be authoritative and unchangeable.
Why does that matter? Ask yourself this: Is it evil to burn a toddler with a cigarette lighter in order to subject his will to yours? Very few humans would say "No," but based on what? WHY do we consider that evil? Who says it's wrong? Me? The toddler? Society? If we cannot trace our judgement back to a fixed moral that issues from the nature of the God who set the standard, then it is simply a consensus of society to call it evil in this time and place, but the act itself cannot be inherently evil. Unless we acknowledge a universal standard, we have no solid ground on which to judge any act as good or evil.
Am I making any sense at all yet? Is it clear that this particular syllogism lives or dies on the definition of its terms and that their definition requires a fixed moral standard, which requires the existence of God?
I think I figured out the problem with the syllogism's form...though I still can't name it. The framing of the argument is faulty in that it assumes a definition of "goodness" that is characterized by actions that APPEAR to be kind, sweet, patient, or happiness-inducing. It eliminates the possibility that REAL goodness comes not from sweetness but from sacrifice, not from a frivolous happiness but from suffering. One can only accept this altered idea of goodness if he affirms and embraces the Truth of The Gospel. One has to believe this God before he can see that in allowing suffering, God is bringing about ultimate good...that it is the only path to life, resurrection, peace and joy. One has to reject the notion that if it causes me pain, it cannot be truly good.
We know instinctively that good often comes from pain. We know it in the simple experience of exercise, as manifest in the popular phrase, "No pain, no gain." But we know it's true on a more profound level as well. As parents, there are things we do to our children that, to their immature consciences, seem cruel. We withhold things. We require things. We even make their lives very difficult at times. But WHY? Don't we have the power to remove their troubles? Often we do. Don't we have a kindly disposition toward them that wants to remove obstacles and pain? Of course we do. BUT...we KNOW that too often their best interest and their final good lies in drinking bitter medicine or enduring hardship. We recognize these experiences as necessary for their ultimate joy and for them to grow to maturity and wisdom. With this understanding, we both allow and even impose "suffering" on them. This is truly GOOD, even though it is painful, because it is done to bring them to a place of true rest. So it is with God.
He determines what is good, not our subjective experiences. Afterall, He sees. He knows. He understands. He will use all means at His disposal to guide us into true goodness...and in that place we begin to define good and evil differently because on some level we have begun to see with His eyes.
I feel the insufficiency of my arguments, but this is what I tried to say in a nutshell:
1. In order to confirm or refute the syllogism, we must define our terms.
2. Defining "good God" and "evil" require the admission of a fixed moral standard.
a. If this standard does not exist, the terms cannot be defined, making the argument void.
b. If this standard does exist, the terms must be defined accordingly.
3. A fixed moral standard can only derive from the fixed nature and works of a Supreme Being, i.e. God.
4. Good and evil then are determined, not by our subjective experience and limited vision, but by the objective God and his unlimited vision.
5. Because of our limited vision, we are not always able to discern rightly between good and evil.
I am well aware that dozens of theologians have addressed these issues more thoroughly, logically, and eloquently, but it's still good for me to have to think about and attempt to articulate it for myself.
Thanks for wading through...
Thanks for wading through...
111 comments:
Good points. I agree. The argument destroys itself, because as you describe, evil cannot be defined apart from God. The existence of evil in that strange way proves God's existence. If you assume evil is real, you are (unwittingly) assuming God is real and is good, for evil can only cogently be understood as that which opposes God's character. The two are realities, and cannot be used to cancel one another out.
I think the fundamental flaw you sensed but couldn't find is in the premises: 1. "If there is a perfectly good God, then there is no evil in the world." *Aaaang* Wrong. Same with the others: "Is God able to prevent evil, but not willing? Then He is malevolent." *Bzzzzzz* Wrong.
I wrote a blog post some months back on this. I think it may get at the technical form of the argument which makes it invalid. The post is more poetic, while what I say below is more straightforward and technically precise. Take a look here: http://a3davis1400.wordpress.com/2010/09/16/the-future-waiting/
In summary, the premises are really arguments in themselves (If a, then b) which contain non-sequiturs. I think the deceptiveness of the argument is that it is an argument within an argument, and it counts on the listener not to engage the premises, which are really arguments, and just take them for granted.
But the non-existence of evil does not logically follow from the goodness of God. (Try proving it!) Nor is the moral obligation to prevent any and all evil from ever coming into existence part of the definition of perfect goodness. (How would we know what a perfectly good being must or must not do in all eventualities, anyway? Are any of us perfectly good? Then who are we to judge in this matter?)
(You can also show how the author in charge of the story is yet untainted by the evil of his characters by referring to any work of fiction: Is Tolkien evil because his character Saruman is a black traitor and murderer? Nobody suggests so. The distance between creator and creature makes this leap of reasoning incoherent.)
Alvin Plantinga described man's search for a just reason for God's allowing evil to the search for a mosquito inside a pup tent. How would we know if a mosquito were in there? A glance inside won't tell us. Even if we scoured every inch of the thing, it's always possible the insect eluded us. A thing that fine is not something our faculties are equipped to detect. Contrast to looking for a St. Bernard in a pup tent. One quick glance inside will tell us whether it is there or not.
[continued]
The arrogance of the argument comes from the assumption that a quick glance can tell the listener whether God could possibly have a just reason for not preventing evil's existence. But God's reasons are not like the St. Bernard; they are like mosquitos. And the mind of God is not a pup tent that we can (theoretically) search every inch of. We finite (and morally compromised) people cannot ever exhaust the possibilities; we can never explore all the corners of God's mind to know whether a good reason exists there for the way He has let history play out. God's reasons are beyond us in this case.
And who among us can know what perfect goodness entails? We can know some basic obvious things, sure. But who can say that perfect goodness means never allowing evil things to exist, ever? Who says? Based on what?
Why must God prevent any and all evil? That's the question I always ask. I don't know of any good answer out there. It's just assumed.
The argument also seems to assume that whatever exists, God approves of. But the Bible says very loudly and clearly that God does not approve of everything that happens in the world. He strongly disapproves of evil (in fact, that is its definition: that which contradicts God). Only a God who approved of evil would be malevolent. God does not approve; therefore, He is not malevolent. That is a sound syllogism.
But disapproval is not enough, as the Psalmists recognized. There is a fundamental contradiction between God's character and much of what is in His world. This tension calls for resolution, it calls for action on God's part. A God who only disapproved, and never acted would not be good, either. The Psalmists knew the answer: God acts. But how and when He acts are profound mysteries. Who's to say how and when? The cross, His greatest act against evil, is also His greatest mystery.
So the answer is in the Day of Judgment. A good God must act against evil, or He is not good. Not must prevent, but must act. That admittedly leaves the question wide open as to what exactly He will do, but it points to the Day of Judgment, on which all things will be well, and all manner of things will be well. God must overcome evil, for He hates it. He has His answer in hand, and gives us hints of it. The syllogism rightly reads, "God is good. There is evil in the world. Therefore, there is coming a Day of Judgment, when all shall be well and God executes His disapproval flawlessly."
There's much more to be said on this, but I think these are the essential issues.
Great post and comment. I'll be back but just no time tonight.
Alicia, first of all...thanks. I know you have spent a lot of time pondering these things and it shows in your response.
So, tell me the NAME of the flaw in the argument!! It's bugging me! It SHOULD follow the pattern, "If A, then B. A. Therefore B." But it doesn't. But I am not experienced enough with formal logic to hone in on the flaw and name it.
Anyway...I have to tell you, I read your remarks first through email and read your second before the first. I thought, "Mosquitos? St. Bernards? What in the heck is she talking about???!!!" Then I read your first comment and understood. ;-)
Excellent, thoughtful answer. Thanks.
Les, going to bed so soon?
[Les, going to bed so soon?]
Apparently.
But back up and at it. This post does really get at the issue.
[The ideas of good and evil necessarily assume the existence of a fixed moral standard. Apart from this, no action or lack of it can be considered morally superior (good) or morally inferior (evil).]
That is the heart of the issue and the failing of premise 1. Everything else falls apart if #1 fails.
Great post. I have linked to it today.
Good dispatch and this post helped me alot in my college assignement. Say thank you you on your information.
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