Les, over at Faith and Life, asked his readers to "interact" with this syllogism and the statement from which it has arisen. So...here I am interacting. I'm just cooperative like that.
1. If a perfectly good god exists, then there is no evil in the world.
2. There is evil in the world.
3. Therefore, a perfectly good god does not exist.
(Epicurus) Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?
First of all, a disclaimer (I'm fond of those!): whole books have been written about the problem of pain and suffering, and I could not hope to address the issues exhaustively here...or anywhere. But I will attempt to give a bare bones argument against the logic of the syllogism.
It seems to me that this syllogism is fundamentally flawed...something isn't right about its form which automatically makes it invalid, but I cannot immediately identify it and don't have time to get out my logic textbooks and figure it out! But, I suspect the technical "form" of the syllogism is not the primary question in this case anyway.
So...supposing the argument were sound in form, the next step is always to determine the soundness of the material...is it true or not? The first task in determining its soundness is to define the major terms, which in this case are "perfectly good God" and "evil."
Neither of these terms are definable in and of themselves and can only be understood in light of presuppositions which involve belief rather than verifiable, objective definitions. If an agreed definition cannot be reached, an argument cannot be satisfactorily refuted or confirmed in its conclusion.
Here is the basic problem: the ideas of good and evil necessarily assume the existence of a fixed moral standard. Apart from this, no action or lack of it can be considered morally superior (good) or morally inferior (evil). Apart from a standard, good and evil become subject to personal or social interpretation, both of which vascillate significantly from person to person, era to era, and culture to culture. Apart from a standard, these terms remain purely subjective, arbitrary, and in continual flux, thereby forfeiting all truth value.
Bottom line: If an objective, fixed moral standard does NOT exist, there is no such thing as inherent good or evil...only personal and social acceptance or rejection of particular behaviors. If that is the case, the argument cannot be proven or disproven because the terms cannot be defined. End of discussion. Refutation or confirmation of this argument requires the acknowledgement that this standard indeed DOES exist and the terms must be defined accordingly.
If we agree that an immoveable, uncompromising, unchanging standard exists, where does it come from? It can only derive from a Supreme Being (i.e. God) who in His nature and by His works has determined the standard. If the source is not authoritative and unchangeable, then the standard cannot be authoritative and unchangeable.
Why does that matter? Ask yourself this: Is it evil to burn a toddler with a cigarette lighter in order to subject his will to yours? Very few humans would say "No," but based on what? WHY do we consider that evil? Who says it's wrong? Me? The toddler? Society? If we cannot trace our judgement back to a fixed moral that issues from the nature of the God who set the standard, then it is simply a consensus of society to call it evil in this time and place, but the act itself cannot be inherently evil. Unless we acknowledge a universal standard, we have no solid ground on which to judge any act as good or evil.
Am I making any sense at all yet? Is it clear that this particular syllogism lives or dies on the definition of its terms and that their definition requires a fixed moral standard, which requires the existence of God?
I think I figured out the problem with the syllogism's form...though I still can't name it. The framing of the argument is faulty in that it assumes a definition of "goodness" that is characterized by actions that APPEAR to be kind, sweet, patient, or happiness-inducing. It eliminates the possibility that REAL goodness comes not from sweetness but from sacrifice, not from a frivolous happiness but from suffering. One can only accept this altered idea of goodness if he affirms and embraces the Truth of The Gospel. One has to believe this God before he can see that in allowing suffering, God is bringing about ultimate good...that it is the only path to life, resurrection, peace and joy. One has to reject the notion that if it causes me pain, it cannot be truly good.
We know instinctively that good often comes from pain. We know it in the simple experience of exercise, as manifest in the popular phrase, "No pain, no gain." But we know it's true on a more profound level as well. As parents, there are things we do to our children that, to their immature consciences, seem cruel. We withhold things. We require things. We even make their lives very difficult at times. But WHY? Don't we have the power to remove their troubles? Often we do. Don't we have a kindly disposition toward them that wants to remove obstacles and pain? Of course we do. BUT...we KNOW that too often their best interest and their final good lies in drinking bitter medicine or enduring hardship. We recognize these experiences as necessary for their ultimate joy and for them to grow to maturity and wisdom. With this understanding, we both allow and even impose "suffering" on them. This is truly GOOD, even though it is painful, because it is done to bring them to a place of true rest. So it is with God.
He determines what is good, not our subjective experiences. Afterall, He sees. He knows. He understands. He will use all means at His disposal to guide us into true goodness...and in that place we begin to define good and evil differently because on some level we have begun to see with His eyes.
I feel the insufficiency of my arguments, but this is what I tried to say in a nutshell:
1. In order to confirm or refute the syllogism, we must define our terms.
2. Defining "good God" and "evil" require the admission of a fixed moral standard.
a. If this standard does not exist, the terms cannot be defined, making the argument void.
b. If this standard does exist, the terms must be defined accordingly.
3. A fixed moral standard can only derive from the fixed nature and works of a Supreme Being, i.e. God.
4. Good and evil then are determined, not by our subjective experience and limited vision, but by the objective God and his unlimited vision.
5. Because of our limited vision, we are not always able to discern rightly between good and evil.
I am well aware that dozens of theologians have addressed these issues more thoroughly, logically, and eloquently, but it's still good for me to have to think about and attempt to articulate it for myself.
Thanks for wading through...